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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

,\I1Cl-L\EL l\IUKASEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
YS.

Case No.

HOBERT S. AARON,

11008

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEl\lENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for personal
;11jurics arising out of an automobile accident.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The Seventh Judicial District Court, at a pretrial
hearing, granted summary judgment of no cause of
:1dio:1 in fawir of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respoudent seeks affirmance of the Court's orutr
of summary judgment granted herein.

STATEl\lENT OF FACTS
Since the record forwarded to this Court by the
Clerk of the District Court does not have the pleading~
numbered by page, it will be necessary to refer to the
pleading itself without reference to page numbers.
The plaintiff and defendant were college studenb
on summer vacation. Plaintiff resided in the State of
New York, and defendant was a resident of New
.T ersey. They desired to visit several cities in the western
states and to seek employment as they traveled from
city to city. They were primarily interested in working
on oil rigs. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 7 & 8) In answer to a
newspaper advertisement in a New York City nem·
paper, the boys accompanied the owner of a vehicle
to the State of Utah, assisting in driving the vehicle
and in sharing the automobile expenses. After arriving,
they obtained various jobs and stayed for several weeks
in Utah and Colorado. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 8-13) There·
after the defendant indicated that the manual labor
'
they were <loing was too strenuous for him and that he
desired to quit his job. It was then agreed that they
would go to California and while there visit with the
defendant's brother. (Ptf. Dep. pp. J.6-47) The tll'r
of them left where they were working and traveled t11

2

the City of Denver.
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The following morning, they
: ns\rered a ne\vspaper ad indicating that an automobile
could be made available to drive to California if they
,,ouid pay the expenses of driving the automobile.
Hoth of them went to the owner of the automobile , and
aftPr the plaintiff made inquiry as to whether or not
J( wuul<l be permissible for the defendant to assist him
in tlic Llriving, he thereafter signed a written contract
with the owner of the automobile agreeing to transport
lhe automobile to California and to pay all the operatiug expenses of the automobile. In addition thereto,
the plaintiff was required to give a $25.00 deposit on
lhe automobile to guarantee its safe delivery, whereupon he was to receive a refund of the money. Plaintiff awl defendant both testified that it was understood
licl ween them they would share in the expenses of
upertaing the automobile, as well as the deposit on
tl1e automobile, and that defendant \vould assist the
plaintiff in driving. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 13-20; Def. Dep.
pp. 9-12)
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They left Denver and drove to the State of Utah
during the first day after receiving the automobile. A
['cw miles south of Huntington, Utah, they drove tci
'lK edge of the roadway to sleep in the car overnight.
The following morning the defendant was the first to
drire. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 21-23) The plaintiff was awake
from the moment they started to drive until the accident
oecurred. ( Ptf. Dep. p. 23) Neither of the parties
11ne familiar with the highway. The weather was clear;
d1(· d:1y \ms sunny and warm. Visibility was good. As
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the defendant drove down the highway, he noticed tlw
the highway cunred to the left. At this point, b11 1
plaintiff and defendant agreed that the car was morin1;
«bout fifty-five miles per hour. The defendant 11 ,'.
unable to negotiate the curve for some reason, anJ tli
car left the highway, overturning. Plaintiff and <l1
fendant "·ei·c both injured. ( Ptf. Dep. p. 23-30)
1

Plaintiff testified that he was fully satisiied wit!,
ih.? defendant's driving. The defendant obeyed all
traffic rules and regulations, did not drive beyond the
speed limit and at no time did he partake of intoxi
eating beverages. (Ptf. Dep. p. 21-30) He did state.
however, that immediately before the car left the high·
way he commented to the defendant to slow down 111
they were entering a curve. ( Ptf. Dep. p. 27 and J3!
Plaintiff thereafter sued the defendant, the owner
of the automobile and the driveaway company pro·
viding the automobile, alleging that the defendan1
Aaron was an agent or employee of the owner and
driveaway company. lVIotions for summary judgmen!
were filed by the owner of the vehicle, the driveaway
company and defendant Aaron based upon the writteu
contract signed by the plaintiff, which contained an
agreement to hold harmless the owner, the driveaway
company, ~nd any of its agents or employees for any
injury to the plaintiff. Defendant Aaron, prior to the
taking of the depositions, entered an Answer to the
Amended Complaint, denying any acts of negligence
or willful misconduct and generally pleading the de·

i'ellses of contributory negligence, agency and joint
'·enlure.

\'·

lt

\I

The Court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the owner and the driveaway company,
hut denied defendant Aaron's motion, based upon his
1 i~cading that the acts of plaintiff and this defendant
!llight constitute a joint venture. Thereafter, defendant
_\arm!, without objection from the plaintiff, was per1i1itted to abandon the defense of joint venture.
The depositions of plaintiff and defendant \vere
:aken in the City of New York by associate counsel.
"·,i'ter reviewing the depositions, a motion for summary
Judgment was again filed by defendant Aaron, claimillg that there was no joint venture as plaintiff now
alleges, based upon the depositions of the parties, and
that based upon plaintiff's own testimony there was
110 evidence of willful misconduct.
The motion was argued to The Honorable Henry
Ruggeri, District Judge, and denied. The matter was
then called on for pretrial some months later. At the
time of pretrial, Judge Ruggeri indicated to counsel
for the plaintiff that he would have granted defendant
Jaron's second motion for summary judgment had
it ;10t been for the fact that perhaps the plaintiff might
Je\'elop further evidence to be considered at the time
of pretrial that the Court was not aware of. The Court
then thoroughly considered the issues claimed by the
plaintiff, and heard the substance of the evidence that
\1u11kl be produced at the time the case went to trial.
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Thereafter, the Court ruled that there was uo eYidelll,
of a joint Yenture as alleged by the plaintiff, nor wa
there any evidence of willful misconduct by the de
fendant.

1

Plaintiff contended that these were the two issues
i1wolYed in the case. (Pretrial transcript p. 34 and 4u,
It should also be noted that at the time of the pre·
trial conference, upon motion of defendant Aaron and
without objection of the plaintiff, the defense of agency
or imputed negligence was abandoned by the defendant
(Pretrial transcript p. 29)

POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT I
SUl\11\lARY JUDG.MENT BY THE COURT
YV/:..S PROPER AS THERE vV AS NO GENC·
INE ISSUE OF FACT TO BE PRESENTED
TO THE JURY.

POINT II
THE PRETRIAL .JUDGE CORRECTLY
RULED THAT THE PARTIES vVERE NOT
ENGAGED IN A JOINT ENTERPRISE.
6
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POINT III
'l'HE PHETRIAL JUDGE 'VAS NOT PRE-

:,'L CDED FHO~I CONSIDERING THE 1\'.10i H).:\' FOll DIS.MISSAL AT THE TIME OF
l'HETRIAL.

POINT IV
e·

THERE \VAS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
1\'ILLFCL _MISCONDUCT ON THE PART
·.iF 'i'IIE DEFENDANT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

T

D

Sl!l\ll\lARY JUDG1\1ENT BY THE COURT
i1f.\S l'HOPER, AS THERE 'VAS NO GENUiNE ISSUE OF FACT TO BE PRESENTED
TU THE JURY.
The Court inquired of plaintiff's counsel whether
or nut the plaintiff had any additional evidence other
lhan the depositions of the plaintiff and defendant
r dlHX:ming the facts as to how the accident happened
()\ the arrangement of the plaintiff and the defendant
iu the use of the automobile. Plaintiff's counsel re~pontlc<l that there was no additional evidence that
r11tdd be presented at the time of trial and that the
depositions ,vere in sum and substance the evidence
'1111LTrning both the issue of joint venture and the issue
1;! \\'illful misconduct. It was agreed that there were
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only two issues to be resolved: 'Vas there a joint \'et:
lure aud. or willful misconduct, excluding plaintiff frou
the terms of the Guest Statute.

1

\'iewi11g the evidence most favorable to the plai 11 .
tiff, as we must do, the testimony of the plaintiff \l'ai
that he and the defendant were college students desiring
to visit several cities in the western Unied States dur.
iug their summer vacation from college. They shared
in the expenses of transportation when the plaintitt
arranged for an automobile to drive to California, Ji
was agreed that defendant would assist him in the
driving, together with sharing expenses of operation.
After being informed by counsel for the plaintiff that
there would not be any additional evidence, the Couri
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to raise a jur.1
question either as to joint venture or willful misconduct
This Court has said on many occasions that al·
though issues concerning joint venture or willful mis
conduct are usually to be decided by a jury, where thr
evidence is such that reasonable minds could not differ.
the Court may rule on the issues as a matter of law.
See Ricciuti vs. Robinson, 2 Ut.2d 45, 269 P.2d 28~.
and Roylance vs. Davies, 18 Ut.2d 395, 424 P.2d W.

POINT II.
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY
RULED THAT THE PARTIES \VERE NOT
ENGAGED IN A JOINT ENTERPRISE.
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The defendant takes no issue with the authorities
c1ed by the plaintiff in support of the proposition that
111cmhers of a joint venture are not barred from suit
;1gaiust one another for the individual negligence of
u11e of the members. In reviewing plaintiff's authorities, specific attention is called to plaintiffs reference
to the llestatement of the Law, Torts 2d, Section 491
!l'.) wherein it is stated:
"The elements which are essential to a joint
enterprise are commonly stated to be four: ( 1)
An agreement, express or implied, among the
members of the group; (2) a common purpose
to be carried out by the group; ( 3) a community
of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the
members; and ( 4) an equal right to a voice in
the direction of the enterprise, which gives an
equal right of control." (Emphasis ours.)
The defendant respectfully submits that elements
No. ( 3) and ( 4) referred to in the Restatement are
absent in the instant case. In a most recent case, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota considered this question. See the case of Frederickson vs. Kleuver, 152
.'.'flV.2d 346 (July 1967). In that case, two brothers
drove to a city to attend a cattle sale, each separately
mterested in inspecting the cattle for his own personal
benefit. On the return trip home, one of the brothers
driving the automobile became involved in an accident
1,ilJ1 the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to join the
other brother as a defendant, alleging a joint enterprise
hv virtue of their attending a cattle sale. The Supreme
CLurt of South Dakota stated in part:

9

"The elements necessary to constitute a j 011 !:
enterprise arc seldom found iu purely socwl
arrangements or matters of friendly accummiJ: ..
tiou between friends, neighbors, aud relatn t,
As pointe<l out in Prosser, La'v of Torts, Thir1i
Edition, Page 490: 'It is generally agreed tli:11
something more is required for a joint enteqm 1l
than the mere showing of a contract or agrtl
ment to travel together to a destination for :
common purpose. Something in the nature 11i
a common busines, financial or pecuniary intere.1:
in the object of the journey is said to he esse11tial.' The essential elements are genera Uy l'.Oll
sidered to be: ( 1) An agreement, express or irn- ·
plied, among the members of the group; (:2; :1 :
common purpose to be carried out by the grouv
( 3) a community of pecuniary interest in that
purpose among the members; and ( 4) an eqn:il :
right to a voice in the direction and control ul
the enterprise, which gives an equal right oi
control."
The Court thereafter ruled that the evidence in tlir
, Frederickson case fell short of showing that the hrother1
were involved in a joint enterprise on their cattle huy·
iug trip. The Court said that since they went to tlie
cattle sale to inspect cattle separately for their individual benefit, not connected with any joint busi11c 1'
arrangement, the elements of a common finaneial i1
tcrest in the purpose of the trip was lacking.

·

•

1

This Honorable Court stated in the recent c:1 1•
of HalJ ,·s. Blackham, 18 Ut.2d 164, 417 P.2d tHP. :J·
follows:
"In the present case, the only purpose of the
trip was duck hunting among friends, :: lrl[
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'

from which they were returning. In that sense,
there was a common purpose, but no decision
ever imputed the driver's negligence to the
guests, just because they were all pleasure riding and meant to enjoy themselves together or
separately at the journey's end."
This Court further stated:
"If we were to conclude as the plaintiffs request that there was a joint venture, the doctrine
of joint enterprise would be applied to situations which are in fact only matters of friendly
or social cooperation and accommodation where
the reason for placing liability upon the participants is not the same as if they were engaged
in business or a commercial venture."

Plaintiff, at page 9 of his brief, cites the case of
Derrick vs. Salt Lake Railway Company, 50 Utah
.mi, 168 Pacific 335. It is respectfully pointed out that
iu the Derrick case, the parties involved in the accident
were traveling salesmen on a business trip. The sole
purpose of the trip was business. It was certainly not
a trip of companionship, society and friendly accommodation as we have in the instant case. Nowhere is it
contended by the plaintiff that he and the defendant
were traveling to California on a mutual business trip
of any nature whatsoever. It is admitted by plaintiff
that they were going to California as part of their
itinerary of visiting various cities in the western states
dming their summer ''acation and in conjunction therewith defendant could visit with his brother. Under no
strdeh of the imagination could such a purpose con-

11

stitute a commercial of business relationship Leh\r·i·
the parties.
Plaintiff, at page 8 of his brief, cites the Reslalt
ment of the Law, Torts 2d as to what the neeessan
elements are to constitute a joint enterprise. One ~[
the elements is a community of pecuniary interest 11 ,
the purpose among the members. This element 11:11,
totally lacking in the instant case as concluded by l111
pretrial judge. The purpose of the trip between plaiuiiff and defendant was purely social. They were aecum
panying each other on their vacation tour for socidy'
and companionship. The plaintiff quotes the ease oi :
l<'ox Y. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049, as support for his claim of joint venture. The quotation nt
page 11 of his brief clearly shows that a mere pleasure·
ride between two individuals does not constitute a join•:
venture. The case involved the owner of the whicl1
who was riding in the vehicle at the time of the accident..
~nj uring a third person, which is unlike the facts i1: '
the instant case.
j

1

At pag~ 12 of plaintiff's brief, he states:
"The parties testified as to their agreem~nt:
their community of purpose; their equal r1ghl
to control and their agreement to share equalh
in the expenses of the trip."

:
:
'
:
i

Defendant respectfully points out that no reference !
to any part of the record or to the depositions of thr I
parties have beeu referred to by the plaintiff in support
of such a statement. The fact of the matter is the tcsli·
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n;ony of the plaintiff an<l the defendant was to the
effect that the plaintiff inquired of the owner of the
automobile if it would be permissible to allow the defendant to assist him in the driving of the vehicle.
1Ptf. Dep. p. 15) The mere fact that the defendant
mis to assist in payment of some of the expenses in the
operation of the automobile on their sight-seeing trip
\u California is not sufficient to constitute a joint
renture. See Greenhalgh v. Green, 16 Ut.2d 221, 398
P.:2d u91; Smith v. Franklin, 14 Ut.2d 16, 376 P.2d
,jH; and Hall v. Blackham, (supra).
Plaintiff argues at page 11 of his brief that each
of the parties had a vested interest in the automobile
and an equal voice and right to be heard respecting the
rletails of the journey. Again, his statement is made
without support of the record in any manner. Nor
does the plaintiff plead that there was an agency or
joint venture between the parties, but specifically alleges in his Amended Complaint that the defendant was
the agent of the owner of the vehicle in driving the
rehicle. The defendant withdrew and abandoned any
claim of agency or joint venture without objection
from the plaintiff, and with approval of the Court.
The plaintiff represented to the pretrial judge that
liis claim against the defendant was based upon two
separate grounds. One, that there was a joint venture
between the parties; and, two, in the event of a failure
to prove joint venture, the defendant was guilty of
willful misconduct. (Trans. p. 34 and 46) Based upon
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ihese allegations and the facts contained withill tl . .
record, coupled with statements of counsel, the Coll!
det;:rminctl as n matter of law that plaintiff was ilr:i
cntitied to rccoyer. The Court correctly ruled that liil
agreement Letween the parties to nrnke a pleasure tr; 1,
to Califor:1ia with a sharing of the automobile expense1
did uot constitute a joint venture.
'

POINT III.
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE. \VAS NOT PRE-'
CLUDED .FROlH CONSIDERING THE M0-1
TION FOR DIS.MISSAL A'i' THE TIME OF!
PRETRIAL.
I
I

At page 13 of plaintiff's brief, he quotes from ll11 !
decision of Judge Keller concerning the first moii11:. ·
for summary judgment by the defendant Aaron wherein the Court denie<l the motion because of the ul/t!Jfl
!ion's of defendant Aaron's Answer that he and ilu.

plaintiff were engaged in a joint or common entcrp1·i· l
al the time of the plaintiff's alleged injuries. (ltalie 1 i
ours.)
Defei~dant has no argume11t with the staternet1i 1

cf ihe Court, based upon the facts presented to the I
Court at tha~ ti1ne. I-Imn'\-er, it is respectfully pointed I
out that foe motion was made at the commencernenl ;
of the suit ~md prior to the taking of the depositi 11111 I
of the parties. Thereafter, the defenrlant Aaron more'.1..
the Court for pnmission to abaDdon the defense iii

14

I

joint enterprise without objection from the plaintiff,
and the Court granted said motion.
Plaintiff also fails to include in his brief that the
motion was based upon matters not now before the
Court, as the original motion for summary judgment
, made by defendant Aarfon was based upon the written
contract introduced into evidence at the commencement
of the suit, and plaintiff's original Complaint. It is
respectfully submitted that a trial court may at any
stage of the proceedings entertain a motion to dismiss
a suit where the Court feels the motion is well taken.
1
Plaintiff maintains that if a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment is denied at the commencement
of litigation that the parties are thereafter forever
barred from obtaining a dismissal of the action by
motion. Such a contention is obviously incorrect on
its face. The Court has the inhe;rent power to dismiss
nn action at any time the Court deems that such action
is without merit and the issues are still before the Court.
1

I

I
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j

POINT IV
THERE 'VAS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WILLFUL :MISCONDUCT ON THE PART
OF THE DEFENDANT.
The plaintiff testified throughout his deposition

! that the <lefendant did not drive at an excessive rate
I

I

of speed, that he obeyed all of the traffic rules and
cl . regulations, and that he did not partake of intoxicatf · ing be1'erages at any time. In substance, he was com-

I
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pletely satisEe<l with the manner in which the defenJa:
was operating the automobile. Under such a statt· "
fac~s, the Court properly ruled that the mere fad th:i .
the defendant failed to negotiate a turn on the high\1;:.i
under the facts as presented by the plaintiff wa~ not
sufficient evidence to justify submitting to auy jury.
an issue of willful misconduct. This Court's attentio11
is respectfully called to the case of Ricciuti Ys. HoLiuson (supra.) ·wherein the Court fully sets forth tlie
conduct of a driver to be considered in relation io ;1
charge of willful misconduct. The opinion further .
states that willful misconduct is not shown by allega :
tions of ordinary negligence. See also ~lilligau \)
Harward, 11 Ut.2d 74<, 355 P.2d 62, and Roylance r~.
Davies, (supra.)
I
:
1

1

1

1

CONCLUSION

It must be kept in mind that the testimony of the I
plaintiff an<l the defendant would constitute the sum ;
nnd substance of the evidence that could be produced '
at the time of trial as to the relationship of the partie~ i
and the conduct of each leading to the accident. It ii I
respectful1y submitted that neither the plaintiff nor the i
defendant testified to any state of facts sufficient 111 :
constitute a joint venture. The plaintiff's evidence ii r
completely lacking in facts showing a business or corn- !
mercial venture involving a pecuniary interest to thr I
parties sufficient to bring the case within the rules :l' '
set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts 211
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Section 491, which he adopts in his brief. The nece:ssary
clements of a joint venture cannot be found in plaintiff's evidence.
The mere fact that defendant failed to negotiate
ihe curve in question does not constitute willful misrnmluct. It is respectfully submitted that the facls a:s
presented by the plaintiff and construed most favorable to him show nothing more than two college students
oil a summer vacation sight-seeing trip to California
and to \·isit with defendant's brother. In accomplishing
1' tl1is purpose, the parties agreed to share the automobile
· : l'Xpenses and the task of driving a borrowed automo, ' bile. Plaintiff alleges in one breath that the defendant
' ' was guilty of willful misconduct in the operation of
the automobile, but in the next breath, states that he
was completely satisfied with the manner in which the
Yehicle was being operated. The inconsistency of plaintiff"s position appears obvious.
1

ti
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It

It is respectfuly submitted that the ruling of the
Trial Court in dismissing plaintiff's case should be
sustained.

Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR
By 'V allace R. Lauchnor

(I:

Attorneys for Respondent
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